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756 IN BE P.A.RKER , [68 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 11898. In Bank. June 24,1968.] 
In re EARL FLOYD PARKER on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Habeas Corpus - Writ as Substitute for Appeal- Effective 
Appeal'Denied.-In the absence of another adequate remedy, 
habeas corpus lies to correct the erroneoUs denial of a right to 
an effective appeal; and petitioner was entitled to habeas cor-
pus to correct the erroneous denial of a right to an effective 
appeal from a misdemeanor conviction in the municipal court 
where the appellate clepartment of the superior court abused 
its discretion in denying him relief under Cal. Rules of Court, 
role 186(b), relating to extensions of time and relief from 
default, from the defauit of his attorney in filing the proposed 
statement on appeal four days late, and where petitioner had 
no other adequate remedy. 
[2a, ib] Criminal Law-Appeals From Inferior CourtS-Abuse of 
Appellate Discretion.-Upon appeal from a misdemeanor con-
viction in a lIlunicipal court, the appellate department of the 
superior court abused its discretion in denying defendant relief 
un4er Cal. Rules of Court, rule 186(b), relating to extensions 
of time and relief from default, from the default of his attor-
ney in filing his proposed statement on appeal four days late 
where no jurisdictional time limit was involved, counsel's mis-
taken belief that he had ten instead of five days to file a 
proposed statement was not so serious as to compel denial of 
an effective and meaningful appeal, counsel candidly admitted 
his mistake in misreading a technical role of appellate pro-
cedure, petitioner was hardly at fault for his counsel's mistaken 
belief, and the delay of four days in the filing of the statement 
was not detrimental to the city attorney or to anyone else. 
[S] Appeal-Right of Appeal: Criminal Law-Appeal-RIght of 
Appeal.-The policy of appellate courts is to hear appeals upon 
the merits and to avoid, if possible, all forfeiture of substantial 
rights upon technical grounds. 
[4] Criminal Law-Appeals From Inferior Courts-Hearing and 
Disposition of Appeal,-On appeal from a misdemeanor con-
viction in a municipal court, defendant was not precluded from· 
challenging denial of relief from default by the appellate 
[1] Habeas corpus on ground of deprivation of right to appeal, 
note, 19 A.L.R.2d 789. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 18. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d. Appeal and Error, §§ 859, 864. 
)lcX. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 12(1); [2] Criminal 
Law, § 1504; [3] Appeal and Error, § 2; Criminal Law, § 1045; [4] 
Criminal Law, § 1510. 
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department of the superior court by a delay of nine days 
before seeking reconsideration of the first ruling denying 
relief; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 107(c), relating to rehearing 
on appeals from municipal courts, applies only to petitions for 
rehearing after judgment and not to applications before judg-
ment for reconsideration of relief from default; and in the 
absence of any rule governing the time for applications before 
judgment for reconsideration of relief from default, defend-
ant's filing within nine days after appellate decision was 
reasonable and timely. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to correct erroneous denial 
of the right to an effective appeal. Writ granted with direc-
tions, 
Richard T. Sykes for Petitioner. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Philip E. Grey, Assistant 
City Attorney, and Stuart Goldfarb, Deputy City Attorney, 
for Respondent. I 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-On June 16, 1967, the Los Angeles 
Municipal Court entered judgment on a jury verdict finding 
petitioner guilty of misdemeanor drunk driving (Veh. Code, 
§ 23102), and on June 21, sentenced him to 20 days in jail 
and imposed a $300 fine or another 30 days. His counsel filed 
a timely notice of appeal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 182 (a)), 
but filed his proposed statement on appeal four days late. 
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 184(d).)1 His subsequent attempts 
lCalifomia RuIes of Court, rule 183(a), specifies that among the con-
tents of the record on an appeal to a superior court from a municipal 
court in a criminal ease shall be ., 10. Any statement or transcript on 
appeal, or both, settled and certified by the trial judge as hereinafter 
provided for in rules 184 and 187." 
Rule 184(a) provides that "Where a consideration of the evidence or 
any part thereof . • • is necessary to a determination of the appeal, the 
same must be set forth in a statement on appeal settled and certified as 
provided in these rules, and if not so set forth, it shall be presumed that 
they were such as to support the judgment or order appealed from. If all 
or any part of sueh evidence or otlWI" proceedings was reported by all 
official reporter, the appellant may give notice in his proposed statement 
that he intends to file a repOl-ter's transcript of the evidence and proceed· 
ings so reported, and to make the same a part of the statement, and if 
he gives sueh notiee he may omit any other statement of the evidence and 
proceedings so reported from his proposed statement." 
Rule 184(b) pro,-ides that the statement shall specify the grounds for 
appeal and so much of the evidence as is necessary for a decision on those 
grounds. 
Rule 184(d) provides that "If the appellant desires to have a state· 
) 
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to obtain relief from that default in the appellate department 
of the superior court and in the Court of Appeal were unsuc-
cessful. Petitioner commenced serving his 20-day sentence and 
then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal. 
After that court denied his petition he sought relief in this 
court. We issued an order to show cause and ordered peti-
tioner released on his own recognizance pending our decision 
herein. 
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The grounds for 
appeal set forth in petitioner's statement on appeal were 
insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, erro-
neous evidentiary rulings, erroneous jury instructions, and 
improper comments by the trial judge. The statement gave 
notice that petitioner intended to prepare and file a reporter's 
transcript of the trial. On July 7 counsel filed a timely notice 
of motion for relief from his default in filing the statement on 
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 186 (b).) 2 In his declara-
tion in support of the motion counsel stated' that ., I was 
under the mistaken belief that the 1;lules provided ten days 
for the filing of such statement. I iwas wrong. There is a 
meritorious defense to this appeal as evidenced by the State-
ment on Appeal, a copy of which is attached hereto and incor-
porated . by reference in this declaration.' '3 The appellate 
department denied the motion without comment on August 1. 
On August 10 counsel filed a motion to reconsider the ruling 
accompanied by points and authorities, again citing his mis-
taken belief that the rules provided 10 days for thc filing of 
the proposed statement on appeal and explaining that "I 
either misread this rule or perhaps my eyesight has deteri-
Dlent Bettled, he shall, within five days after filing notice of appeal, serve 
on the rcspondent and file with the trial court a proposed statement on 
appeal. If in such proposed statement appellant gives notiee that a 
reporter's transcript is to be filed and made a part thereof, as provided in 
subdivision (a) of this rule, he may file or cause to be filed, within 15 
days after the filing of his proposed statement, a transcript of the evi-
dence ... reported by an official reporter, certified by that reporter to 
be correct ..•. Any such transcript, when set.tled and certified as pro-
vided in rule 187, shall be deemed and become a part of the statement. 
. . . If the appellant fails to serve and file a proposed statement on 
appeal within the time limited by these rules . . . his right to have such 
a statement settled and certified shall forthwith terminate." 
Rule 187 provides the procedure for settling the statement or tran-
script, or both . 
. 2' I The superior court may for good cause relieve a party from a default 
occasionedhy any failure to comply with these rules ... proyided that 
applieation for such relief must he made within 30 days. 
3The notice of motion for relief 1l1so indicated that the reporter's tran-
script had been prepared and sent to the trial court for filing. 
\. 
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orated to the point where I need glasses.' '4 The appellate 
division denied the motion on August 25 on the ground that 
"Due diligence [was] not exercised in filing [the] motion for 
reconsideration. (Cf. rule 107 (c), California Rules of 
Court.) "5 On October 2 counsel filed an opening brief on 
appeal, contending only that rule 107 (c) did not apply and 
that the record should be augmented with the transcript, 
whieh· by then had been prepared and filed with the trial 
court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 189.)6 Counsel also 
requested an extension of time to file a supplemental brief 
when the reporter's transcript was filed. The appellate 
department affirmed the conviction on November 20, noting 
that no reason appeared for permitting indirectly what it had 
twice before refused to do directly, that the case was before it 
on the merits, and thnt no brief or argument on the merits 
had been presented. On November 27 the court denied a 
rehearing but granted a petition for certification to the Court 
of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 63.)7 On December 5 
4Counsel added: "I reeall reading all of Rule 184 on the! day after the 
notice of appeal was filed. I read the rule from a book prepared by the 
Daily Journnl and that book truly reeites that the time limitation is five 
days. The print however is somewhat small. I honestly and mistakenly 
misinterpreted that print and honestly and mistakenly believed that I 
had ten days in which to file said statement. I am 43 years of age and 
have never woni glasses. I have noticed recently that some print seems 
to be getting difficult to read. As an example, I detected a difficulty in 
reading the Social Services information card in connection with a recent 
matter. A copy of that carcl is attached hereto as Exhibit A." 
Ii" A petition for rehearing must be ... filed within seven days after 
the judgment shall have been pronounced .•.• " 
8' 'On a sufficient showing by affidavit, or otherwise, that evidence was 
taken or proceedings were had in the trial court or that papers are there 
on file which are material to a disposition of the appeal and are not 
includl'd in the record 011 appeal, and a showing of good cause why the 
same bavc not been included in said i'ecord, the superior court may 
authorize the trial judge to make a further certificate as to such evidence 
or other proceedings or papers, and direct the snme, when so certified, 
to be added to the record." 
7Tbe certification was for the purpose of settling the following impor· 
tant questions of law: 
" (1) In a criminal ease where defcndant has been representee} 
throughout by private counsel who failed to file a Stutement on Appeal 
within five days as required by Rule 184, California Rules of Court, and 
where a petition for relief from default under Rule 186(b), California 
Rull-s of Court, has been made within thirty days after the default, is 
good eause shown rpquiring the court to grant relief when counsel's only 
reason for not making a timely filing was his 'mistaken belief that the 
rules provided ten dRYS for the filing of such statement' and whose only 
explanation ofsnid mistaken belief was 'I either misread this rule or 
perhaps my eyesight has deteriorated to the point I need glasses" - . 
"(2) Where the cause is before tIle court on the merits after due 
notice of time and place of hearing and time for filing briefs, and appel· 
) 
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the Court of Appeal denied the transfer. (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 62(c).) The municipal court filed the remittitur 
on December 21, and petitioner commenced serying his sen-
tence on January 25, 1968. 
[1) In the absence of another adequate remedy, llabeas 
corpus lies to correct the erroneous denial of a right to an 
effective appeal. (In re Martin (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 133, 140-141 
[23 Cal.Rptr. 167, 373 P.2d 103]; In re Byrnes (1945) 26 
Cal.2d 824, 826-828 [161 P.2d376].) Petitioner has no other 
adequate remedy. Since the appellate department had already 
denied him relief from default on several occasions, it would 
have been futile to request that court to recall its remittitur. 
Although the appellate department affirmed the judgment 
instead of dismissing the appeal, it denied an effective appeal 
by deciding the appeal on a record that did not include the 
transcript necessary to permit petitioner to present his only 
claims of error. [2a] Accordingly, the crucial question is 
whether the appellate department abused its discretion in 
denying petitioner relief under rule 186(b) from the default 
of his attorney in filing his proposed stutement on appeal four 
days late. We hold that it did. 
[3] "The policy of appellate courts [should be] 'to hear 
appeals upon the merits and to avoid, if possible, all forfei-
ture of substantial rights upon technical grounds.' (People v. 
Megugorac (1938) 12 Ca1.2d 208 [82 P.2d 1108].)" (In re 
Martin, supra, 58 Ca1.2d 133, 139.) [2b] A review of the 
varied facts of the many cases that have invoked this policy to 
grant relief from default has convinced us that it likewise 
applies here. (See, e.g., People v. Camarillo (1967) 66 Ca1.2d 
455, 458 [58 Cal.Rptr. 112, 426 P.2d 512] ; People v. Curry 
(1965) 62 Ca1.2d 207, 210 [42 Cal.Rptr. 17, 397 P.2d 1009] ; 
In re Martin, supra, 58 Ca1.2d 133, 139-141; Strong v. Mack 
(1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 805, 810 [137 P.2d 748]; People v. 
Carpenter (1939) 36 Cal.App.2d Supp. 760, 761 [93 P.2d 
276] ; People v. Me[]ugorac, supra, 12 CaI.2d 208, 209; Jarkieh 
v. Badagliacco (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 426, 431-433 [156 
P.2d 969].) No jurisdictional time limit is involved; counsel's 
mistaken belief that he had 10 instead of 5 days to file the 
proposed statement, although not to be condoned, was not so 
serious as to compel the denial of an effective and meaningful 
lant's brief makes no mention of the merits of the ease but is devoted 
entirely to procedural matters on appeal in connection with his attempt 
to obtain relief from default, may the court properly proceed with the 
disposal of the ease on the merits'" 
) 
J 
June 1968] INRE PARKER 
[88 C.2d 756; 69 Cal.Rptr. 85.441 P.2d 8051 
761 
appeal; judges as well as attorneys sometimes misread the 
technical rules of appellate procedure i counsel candidly 
admitted his mistake; petitioner was hardly at fault for his 
counsel's mistaken belief i the delay of four days in the filing 
of the statement was not detrimental to the city attorney or to 
anyone else. . 
[4] The city attorney, invoking rule 107(c) (supra, fn. 5) 
contends that petitioner is precluded from challenging the 
appellate department's denial of relief from default on the 
ground that he delayed for nine days before seeking reconsid-
eration of the first ruling denying relief. Rule 107 (c), how-
ever, applies only to petitions for rehearing after judgment, 
and petitioner's counsel had no reason to believe that the 
court might apply it to applications before judgment for 
reconsideration of relief from default. In the llbsence of any 
rule governing the time for such applications, petitioner's 
filing within nine days was reasonable and timely, 
Petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks and the writ is 
therefore granted. The Appellate Department of the Superior 
Court for Los Angeles County is directed to recall its remitti-
tur, vacate its judgment, permit petitioner to file a statement 
on appeal, and proceed accordingly thereafter. Petitioner 
shall remain at large on his own recognizance until his appeal 
is finally determined. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Yosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
